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1  INTRODUCTION  
 
  
It is trite to say that the adjudication of socio-economic rights is a new enterprise in 
South African jurisprudence, as it is to the jurisprudence of many other jurisdictions. 
Professor van Rensburg’s paper seeks to analyse the influence of political, socio-
economic and cultural considerations on the interpretation and application of socio-
economic rights in the Bill of Rights. The pivots for discussion are the decisions of 
the Constitutional Court in the Soobramoney,
1
 Grootboom
2
 and Treatment Action 
Campaign
3
 cases which, thus far, are the only cases in which the Constitutional 
Court has substantively determined the nature and parameters of socio-economic 
rights and obligations under the South African Constitution. My response is 
somewhat deferential in that I largely concur with many of the observations that 
Professor van Rensburg makes. In some respects, however, I have attempted to 
bring into the analysis of Soobramoney, Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign 
not so much new insights, but rather different emphases. Likewise, my response is 
constructed around the three cases. I begin with Soobramoney.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*     Linda Jansen Van Rensburg 'Ajudicating socio-economic rights – transforming South African Society (2002).  
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1    Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1997 12 BCLR 1696 (CC).  
2    The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 11 BCLR 1169  
(CC).  
3    Unreported. Case CCT 8/02.  
 
C Ngwena  PER/PELJ 2003(6)2 
72/173 
 
2  SOOBRAMONEY  
 
To a large extent, Soobramoney is a somewhat unfair template upon which to 
construct any analysis of the approach of the Constitutional Court to socio-economic 
adjudication primarily because it is the very first case that the Court, with virtually no 
institutional experience in socio-economic adjudication, was being asked to chart 
new territory. Nonetheless, the Court's interpretation of section 27 can scarcely 
escape criticism.  
  
Professor van Rensburg is right in lamenting the extent to which the Court 
interpreted section 27(3). The Court unduly minimised the relevance of section 11 – 
the right to life – to the section 27(3) argument that the state had a duty not to refuse 
the appellant medical treatment.
4
 The Court also categorically interpreted section 
27(3) as a negative rather than a positive right to the extent of perhaps undermining 
the import of the duties of health care providers.
5
 Even conceding that chronic renal 
failure of the type that the appellant was afflicted with did not constitute a medical 
emergency as contemplated by section 27(3),
6
 the effect of the Court’s interpretation 
was to cast the provisions of the Bill of Rights as atomistic elements rather than units 
of an interconnected web. Indeed, it is not inappropriate to interpret the Court’s 
approach to section 27(3) as legalistic to the extent that it detracted from the 
generous purposive/contextual approach to constitutional interpretation that is out of 
synchrony with the Courts own professed approach or human rights jurisprudence in 
general.
7
 Fear that a holistic line of interpretation might lead to consumers of health 
care services making additional demand on the state should not have dissuaded the 
Court from interpreting section 27(3) as a positive right that is in part animated by 
section 11 – the right to life. Socio-economic rights draw sustenance from the 
imposition of positive obligations. It means precious little say that no one may be 
refused emergency medical treatment and yet decline to impose on health care 
providers a positive duty to make such treatment available. Scott and Alston have 
described the Courts approach as constituting “negative textual inferentialism”.
8
  
 
 
4    Soobramoney (note 1) para 15.  
5    Ibid para 20.  
6    The appellant was suffering from end-stage renal failure. He was also suffering from coronary artery disease, 
ischaemic heart disease and diabetes and hypertension. He had a history of a stroke. On account of this 
medical history, he was not a candidate for a kidney transplant for the reason that he had a very poor 
prognosis.  
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The proper way to limit the appellants demand for renal dialysis should not have 
been an attempt to resurrect a literal approach but an application of section 27(2) 
which renders the provision of health care resources subject to available resources.   
 
The shortcomings of Soobramoney are not confined to the legalistic interpretation of 
section 27(3) but stretch a little beyond that. It is true as Professor van Rensburg 
observes that the Court in Soobramoney identified resources as the most important 
element in the determination of socio-economic rights. It is self-evident that 
resources are finite and that the imposition of a ceiling on the quantity and quality of 
health care services that the state can provide is inevitable. It is also clear that the 
type of treatment that the appellant was seeking was beyond the reach of the state 
to the extent that he was seeking lifelong renal dialysis. However, at a doctrinal level, 
another shortcoming with Soobramoney is that it did not illuminate the nature and 
scope of the inquiry that a court has to undertake to determine the extent of 
resources available to the state. Soobramoney seems to suggest that the point of 
departure is what resources are asserted to be available by the state and if the 
assertion is bona fide and the resources thus claimed to be available support the 
states’ contention, that is the end of the judicial the inquiry. While this approach has 
the virtue of recognising generously the doctrine of separation of powers, it sits 
uneasily with a Bill of Rights that has unequivocally made socio-economic rights 
justiciable.  
  
Soobramoney failed to make it clear that when determining available resources, the 
judicial inquiry must not only seek to determine what resources the state has made 
available, but also the resources the state ought to have made available in the light 
of resources at its disposal.
9
  
 
 
 
 
 
7     S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 4 BCLR 665 (CC) para 9; De Waal et al The Bill of Rights handbook 
(2001) 130-135.  
8   Scott and Alston ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a transnational context: a comment on 
Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise (2000) 16  206-268 at 237.   
9    Moellendorf ‘Reasoning about resources: Soobramoney and the future of socio-economic rights claims’ 
(1998)  327-333.  
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Notwithstanding that courts are not particularly suited to involving themselves in 
matters of budgetary appropriations, there must, nonetheless, be an inclination on 
part of the court to impugn executive and medical decisions about the allocation of 
resources. As the Court itself reiterated in Treatment Action Campaign, as long as 
executive policy impacts on the respect, promotion, protection and fulfilment of 
fundamental rights, the doctrine of separation of powers cannot be delineated by 
rigid boundaries.
10
 The task of the judiciary is no longer to conduct review the 
traditional sense and inquire only into the form of executive policy decision. The 
substance has become as important as the form. Rationality and good faith are no 
longer sufficient conditions. The reasonableness of the decision must now be guided 
by constitutional benchmarks and, foremost, by the obligations placed on the state 
by the Constitution.  
Health intertwines with many others sectors. It is dependent upon many factors and 
not just health care services. It belongs to both the private and the public domain. In 
this regard, Sachs J’s observation that the courts are not the proper place to resolve 
agonising personal and medical problems that underlie allocations of resources and 
that the courts cannot replace the more intimate struggle that must be borne by the 
patient, those caring for the patient and those who care about the patient, may seem 
to be an appropriate reflection of a practical reality.
11
 At the same time, however, the 
remark by the learned judge can be (mis)construed as relegating the provision of 
health care to the private rather than the public domain and insufficiently vindicating 
access to health as a human right. Madala J in his supporting judgment went as far 
as describing rights as the “ideal” and “something to be strived for” to the extent of 
perhaps diminishing the status of socio-economic rights from enforceable rights to 
mere aspirations.
12
 The acknowledgement in the Bill of Rights of health care as a 
fundamental right conspicuously represents a broadening of government 
responsibility. Whilst the responsibilities of individuals, families, private charities and 
religious organisations are not being effaced, nonetheless, health has become a 
major governmental responsibility unlike in the past. With all its inherent problems, 
health has become part of the more inclusive understanding of human rights and 
constitutional adjudication of socio-economic rights must faithfully reflect this shift, 
even at semantic level.
13
  
 
10   Treatment Action Campaign (note 3) para 98.  
11   Soobramoney (note 1) 58.  
12   Ibid para 42.  
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3  GROOTBOOM  
 
  
Grootboom, of course, represents a coming of age for the Constitutional Court in that 
the Court was able bring into the adjudication of socio-economic rights the 
appropriate legal armamentarium. The Court was able to take advantage of the 
jurisprudence that has been developed by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights under the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. I do not differ with, but put a different emphasis to, Professor van Rensburg's 
submission that after Grootboom it appears that the Court will no longer investigate 
rationality and bona fides, but will instead investigate reasonableness. I see the 
approach of the Court in Grootboom not so much as an abandonment of the 
rationality and bona fides inquiry, but a shift towards reasonableness. I would argue 
that rationality and bona fides are still prerequisites, or better still, they have become 
part of and not the only criteria for determining the reasonableness of state policies 
and programmes. Rationality and good faith are now part of what can be described 
as an integrated substantive reasonableness test that the state has to meet if its 
policies and programmes for the discharge of socio-economic obligations are to pass 
constitutional muster. In Grootboom the state did pass rationality and good faith 
tests. In this connection, Jacoob J said:  
  
What has been done in execution of the programme is a major achievement. Large 
sums of money have been spent and a significant number of houses have been 
built. Considerable thought, energy, resources, and expertise have been and 
continue to be devoted towards the process of effective house delivery. It is a 
programme that is aimed at achieving the progressive realisation of the right to 
adequate housing.
14
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13   Chapman ‘Core obligations related to the right to health and their relevance for South Africa’ in Brand and 
Russell (eds) Exploring the core content of socio-economic rights:  (2002) 38.  
14   Grootboom (note 2) para 53.  
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One can surmise that had the programme not been thought out rationally and 
executed in good faith, by for example not involving all spheres of government or 
targeting beneficiaries on account of race, then it would not have passed the hurdle 
of rationality and good faith and it would have been unnecessary to inquire into 
substantive reasonableness.
15
   
  
If in Soobramoney, the Court was guilty of seeing provisions of the Bill of Rights as 
disembodied elements isolated from one another, then in Grootboom it repaired this 
shortcoming. Grootboom represents a holistic approach to the interpretation of socio-
economic rights. In this regard, I would be more generous that Professor van 
Rensburg and say that the Courts displayed a fulsome rather than “hesitant context 
sensitive” approach. From the beginning to the end of the judgement, the Court drew 
sustenance from the foundational values of the Constitution. Reasonableness in 
Grootboom transcended rationality and good faith and took an egalitarian and 
remedial orientation. Achieving substantive equality and protecting human dignity 
became overriding goals in the aftermath a legacy of state spawned gross inequality 
in access to housing. Protecting the vulnerable and weakest in our society as part of 
the transformation of post apartheid and post colonial South Africa fitted in well into 
the foundational values of the Constitution. Recourse to the jurisprudence of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was crucial in dispelling the 
myth of socio-economic rights as intangible rights that are unascertainable and 
unrealisable. The respondent’s housing programme, though commendable in many 
respects, failed because it did not accommodate the immediate needs of the poorest 
and perforce most vulnerable in our society.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15   At para 47 Jacoob  said “All spheres of government are intimately involved in housing delivery and the 
budget allocated by national government appears substantial. There is a single housing policy and a 
subsidy system that targets low income earners regardless of race”.  
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The one area perhaps in which Grootboom spoke with hesitancy rather than 
forthrightness relates to core minimum entitlements and core minimum obligations. 
The Court was right in suggesting that the idea of core minimum should be seen as 
an integral part of rather than independent from the reasonableness inquiry. There is 
indeed no suggestion in General Comment 3 of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights that the concept of minimum core obligations should be used to 
found a free standing rights. What the concept does, however, is to provide an 
indication for establishing prima facie evidence of non-compliance with socio-
economic obligations. Once the prima facie evidence has been established, the onus 
then shifts to the state to offer a rebuttal by demonstrating that despite taking all 
reasonable measures at its disposal, it has nevertheless failed to meet even 
rudimentary needs. This is apparent from the following observations that the 
Committee made in paragraph 10 of General Comment 3:  
  
Thus, for example, a State in which any significant number of individuals is deprived 
of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary healthcare, of basic shelter and housing, 
or of the most basic forms of education, is prima facie, failing to discharge its 
obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as 
not tot establish such a minimum core obligation, it would largely be deprived of its 
raison d'être. By the same token, it must be noted that any assessment as to 
whether a state has discharged its minimum core obligation must also take account 
of resource constraints applying within the country. …In order for a State Party to 
be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack 
of available resources, it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use 
all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, 
those minimum obligations.
16
  
  
The concept of minimum core obligations is no more that a tool for impressing upon 
states that to protect human dignity they should at least endeavour to do the little 
they can even in the face of economic and other constraints. The problem in 
Grootboom, however, is that the Court did not have at its disposal the content of 
minimum core obligations in respect of the housing. Core minimum obligations 
should not differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction or place to place, as the Court in 
Grootboom appears to have understood.
17
 Instead, they should apply uniformly 
everywhere to underscore their universality as international human rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
16    Emphasis original.  
17   Grootboom (note 2) para 32.  
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4  TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN  
 
  
Treatment Action Campaign benefited from the jurisprudence that the Court 
developed in Grootboom. The Court demonstrated a willingness to impugn executive 
policy decisions that impact on the respect, protection, promotion and fulfilment of 
rights in the Bill of Rights. I agree with Professor van Rensburg observations that 
while the Court was conscious of its limited capacity to deal with policy issues that 
have budgetary implications, and the preeminence of the executive in such matters, 
the Court, nonetheless, did not interpret the doctrine of separation as meaning 
judicial abdication from policy matters. Indeed the effect of the Court's decision was 
not only to censure government policy on HIV/AIDS, but also to rewrite it in 
unambiguous terms. As with Grootboom, the Court went beyond rationality and good 
faith to inquire into the substantive reasonableness of the decisions against the 
backdrop of discrete socio-economic rights – section 27 – but also the foundational 
values of the Constitution, including egalitarian values.  
  
Treatment Action Campaign, however, perpetuates a misunderstanding of the import 
of the concept of minimum core rights and obligations. The Court was reluctant to 
embrace the concept of minimum core obligations because it believed that this would 
mean that for every socio-economic rights, they would be a free standing minimum 
right.
18
 As submitted earlier this is a misconstruction of paragraph 10 of General 
Comment 3. Professor van Rensburg endorsement of the Court's approach in this 
regard, also seems to repeat the misconception.  
  
5  Concluding remarks  
 
Professor van Rensburg paper had the difficult challenge of attempting to analyse a 
jurisprudence that is very much in the making. Some of the contours of that 
jurisprudence have yet to be clear. The cases upon which to analyse the approach 
and contribution of the Court are still sparse.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
18    Treatment Action Campaign (note 3) paras 26-29.  
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Notwithstanding this limitation, Professor van Rensburg is justified in treating 
Soobramoney as having contributed little to the understanding and interpretation of 
socio-economic rights, and Grootboom has marking the beginning of an earnest 
attempt by the Court to invoke the appropriate interpretive principles for adjudicating 
socioeconomic rights.  It is in Grootboom that the Court not only adopted a holistic 
purposive and contextual approach to interpretation of socio-economic rights, but 
also had recourse to the jurisprudence of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. Treatment Action Campaign was evidently a beneficiary of the 
precedent laid by Grootboom. Grootboom and most certainly Treatment Action 
Campaign represent a drawing back of the traditional frontiers of the doctrine of 
separation of powers. If they are interpretive errors in Grootboom and Treatment 
Action Campaign, they pale into significance when juxtaposed with the virtues. The 
one area however, where the Court could have assisted the state in complying with 
socio-economic right would have been in embracing rather than doubting the efficacy 
of concept of minimum core obligations and rights. Core minimum obligations and 
rights are an instrument for putting the onus upon the state to justify noncompliance 
with socio-economic obligations. They provide the state with practical benchmarks 
for formulating policies and programmes that are aimed at discharging socio-
economic obligations. They provide the Court with a tangible yardstick for measuring 
the performance of the state.  
